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75'S5-A. 
[L. A No.~. 20818, 20819. In Bank. Aug. 19, 1949.] 
II. C. 1\11 LLSAP. 8S Special Administrator, etc., Respondent, 
v. DAISY D. HOOPER et aI., Appellants. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] Appeal-Time to Appeal-Extension-By Motion for· New· 
Trial.-Tbe efi'el'live dull' of an order of denial of a motion 
for n~w trill I is the date of the minute entry, and the 30-day 
extl'I1~ion within which notice of appeal from the judgment 
may be fll('d under rule 3(a) of Rules of Appeal does not begin 
to run until such entry. 
[2] Id.-Time to Appeal-Extension-By Motion for New Trial.-
A notice of appeal from a judgment is not filed in time and 
the apppal must be dismissed where, although the notice is 
fill'd within 30 days after the minute entry of an order deny-
ing a new trial, the order was inefliective because the motion 
had previously been denied by operation of law under Code 
Civ. Proc., § 660. 
[3] Id.-Time to Appeal-Extension-By Motion for New Trial. 
-A notice of appeal from a judgment is filed too late where 
it is filed more than 30 days after a motion for new trial was 
denied by operation of law under Code Civ. Proc., § 660, be-
cause the trial court had failed to act OD the motion within 60 
days from the date of service of notice of entry of judgment, 
computing such date of service by adding one day to the date 
[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 407; 3 Am.Jur. 149. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-8J Appeal and Error, §275; [4] New 
'tl'iul, ~ ~16; [5] COIll"tS, ~ 88. 
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of mailing within the city limits as authorized by Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1013. 
[4] New Trial - Hearing and Determination - Statutory Period 
for Determination.-The 60-day period within which a motion 
for new trial must be decided under Code Civ. Proc., § 660, 
does not run from the date of physical receipt by counsel of 
the notice of entry of .iud~('nt. but from the date of service, 
computed under Code Civ. Proc., § 1013. 
[5] Courts-Rules of Court.-The Rules on Appeal are constitu-
tional in view of the authority given the Judicial Council, 
under Const., art. VI, § la, and Code Civ. Proc., § 961, to 
adopt rules governing Ilppellate procedure in this state. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Oeo. A. Dockweiler, Judge. Appeals dismissed on motion. 
Paul J. Otto and Irvin C. Evans for Appellants. 
William Ellis Lady for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-Respondent moves to dismiss the appeals 
herein on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed too 
late. . 
Judgment for respondent was entered in the trial court on 
December 31, 1947. Notice of entry of judgment was mailed 
in Los Angeles on January 9, 1948, and filed on the same 
day. It was received at the offic~ of counsel for the ap-
pellants on January 12th, and notice of intention to move for 
a new trial was filed on January 19th. The motion was de-
nied by the trial court on March 9th, but the order of denial 
was not entered in the minutes until March 17th. Notice of 
appeal was filed on April 13th. 
[1] The effective date of an order of denial of a motion 
for new trial is the date of the minute entry. and the 30-day 
extension within which notice of appeal from the judgment 
may be filed under rule 3 (a) does not begin to run until such 
entry. (Jablon v. Henneberger, 33 Cal.2d 773 [205 P.2d 1] ; 
Van Tiger v. Superior Oourt, 7 Ca1.2d 377 [60 P.2d 851]; 
Brownell v. Superior Oourt. 157 Cal. 703 [109 P. 91].) [2] The 
date of the order of denial was therefore March 17th. That 
order was ineffective. however, because the motion had been 
denied by operation of law Ilndpr SP('tiOll 660 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure before the date of the minute entry. (Lancel 
" C.2d-7 
) 
! 
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v. Postlethwait, 172 Cal. ::326 1156 P. 486J; see Mellin v. 
TI'ousdell, 33 Ca1.2d 858 12U;) P .2d 1036 J .) The 30-day pe· 
riod of extension must therefure bt' calculated from the date of 
th·l.ial of the llJoliuu by Opt'l':ltivll vf law, Illld if notice of 
Hl'Pcal was filed after tlJe l'xpir;\tifJll of that perIod, the appeal 
must b(' dismissed. (Ill ,lIi'/I v. 1'1"fJUsdell, 33 Ca1.2d 858 1205 
P.2d 1036); Jablon v. Hcnnebl!rger, 33 Ca1.2d 773 [205 
P.2d 1).) 
[3] Sectkn 6GO of the C()dc flf Civil Procedure provides 
that if a ruotion for new trial is not determined within 60 
duys from the dp.te of service of notice of entry of judgment, I 
it is deemed denied by operation of law. Notice vf entry 
herein was mailed on January mh. With the allowallce of an 
additional day for mailing within the Los Angeles city limits 
Huder section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it appears 
tl1at tll(' date of service was January lOth. Sixty days there-
aftL'r, or on ~Iarch 10th, the motion was denied by operation 
of law ulllkl' sl'clion (:60. The 30-day extension granted by : 
rule 3(a) bl'gan to run on that date and expircd on April 9th; 
~otice of appeal was not filed until April 13th; it was ther(:-
fu1'e too late and the appeal must be dismissed. 
[4] Appellants seek to avoid thi!' result by urging a differ-
('nt construetion of the releyant statutes. They contend that 
the time within which the motion was to be decided by the 
trial conrt did not begin to run until physical receipt by 
cOllnsel of the notice of entry of judgment on January 12th. I 
That would mal{e the date of denial of the motion for new trial 
by operation of law March 12th. They make the further con-
tention that the time for determination was extended another \ 
t,,·o days Ullder section 12a (b) of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure,· because two holidays, Lincoln's and Washington's I 
Birthdays, occurred within the 60-day period. These holidays 
would have extel:lded the time for the trial court to rule until I 
March 14th. Since March 14, 1948, was a Sunday, appellants! 
claim that the motion for new trial was not denied until 
March 15th. The 30-day extension under rule 3 (a) did not 
expire until April 14th by their calculations, and the notice 
of appeal was timely since it was filed on· April 13th . 
• ,' As to any nct prO'rided or required by law to be pcrf<>rmed within 
8 specified period of timc, such periorl of tilDe is hcreby Ilxtended-
"(a) ... 
"(b) B~' such numher of days as equals the number of holidays 
(other thaI' special holi(1n~'s) appoi::te~ hy t.he Presitlcnt or by thp. 
Governor and which occur within or during such period"; 
/ , 
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These contentions canllot be upheld. It will be noted that 
not only noes section 660 spPcificalIy provide for the runnin~ 
of the 60-day period from the date of sct'/Jicc of notice of entry, 
but that when the Legislature intended a time limit to run 
from the date of receipt, as in section 659, it used language 
appropriate to that purpose. Its use of different langtlagc ill 
section 660 shows clearly that the date of service, comput(·d 
under section 1013, is controlling, and that the 60-day pel'iod 
runs from that time.-
[5] There is no merit to appellants' contention that the 
Rules on Appea] are unconstitutional. Under article V], 
section la, of the California Constitution and section 96] of 
the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no doubt of the au-
thority of the Judicial Council to adopt rules goverr.illg 
appellate procedure in this state. 
The appeals herein are disP.lissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Enm,.nds, J., Carter, J., Schaucr, 
.J., and Spence, J., cuncurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
15,1949. 
"Even under a;,pellallts' contelltion that tloe period runs from tloe .late 
of rereipt of the notice of entry d judgment, the notice of appeal waR 
filed too late. Sectioll 12a extends time only when holidays appuint,·d 
by the President or the Governor (i. e., irregular holidays whose date 
cannot be precisely foretold) intervene during the period in question. 
Holidays established by the Legislature under section 10 of the Political 
Code do not extend timp under section 12a. (Francis v. Superior Court, 
68 CaI.App.:!d 643 [157 P.2d 23]; L)lncil v. Harrell, 44 Cal.App.2d 863 
[113 P.2d :!(il]; adO/Tilt Rami"It, Inc. v. Belir, 40 Cnl.A.pp.2d 54 [104 
P.2d 410].) Washington's and Lincoln '8 Birthdays are holidays estab· 
lished by section 10 and did not, tl1ereforc, affect the tiuH' within w~.ieh 
appellants could filtl their notice of appeal. The tiln!' exteu~ion granted 
by rule 3(a) hn~ing expirl'd on April 9th, 110 days from service of notice 
of entry of judgment, the notice <.f appeal of April 13th was too late. 
